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Abstract We study prudence and temperance (next to risk aversion) in social
settings. Previous experimental studies have shown that these higher-order risk
preferences affect the choices of individuals deciding privately on lotteries that only
affect their own payoff. Yet, many risky and financially relevant decisions are made
in the social settings of households or organizations. We elicit higher-order risk
preferences of individuals and systematically vary how an individual’s decision is
made (alone or while communicating with a partner) and who is affected by the
decision (only the individual or the partner as well). In doing so, we can isolate the
effects of other-regarding concerns and communication on choices. Our results
reveal that the majority of choices are risk averse, prudent, and temperate across
social settings. We also observe that individuals are influenced significantly by the
preferences of a partner when they are able to communicate and choices are payoff-
relevant for both of them.
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1 Introduction
Much of the economic research on behavior under uncertainty has focused on risk
aversion. However, over the course of the last decades it turned out that higher-order
risk preferences like prudence and temperance also impact many decisions. Their
importance has first been pointed out with respect to saving decisions (e.g. Leland
1968; Sandmo 1970). Subsequently it has been shown that higher-order risk
preferences also affect behavior in various fields, such as auctions (e.g. Eso¨ and
White 2004; Kocher et al. 2015), bargaining (e.g. White 2008; Embrey et al. 2016),
public good provision (e.g. Bramoulle´ and Treich 2009), or medical decision
making (e.g. Eeckhoudt 2002; Felder and Mayrhofer 2014, 2017). This study makes
the first attempt to assess higher-order risk preferences in social settings under
controlled conditions. In particular, we focus on two aspects that have been found to
influence behavior in various experiments (often contrary to standard economic
theory): communication and concerns about the payoff of others. In a laboratory
experiment we elicit higher-order risk preferences of individuals and systematically
vary how an individual’s decision is made (alone or while communicating
anonymously with a partner) and who is affected by the decision (only the
individual or the partner as well).
In the framework of expected utility theory risk aversion is captured by a
negative second derivative of the utility function. Prudence refers to a positive third
derivative (Kimball 1990) and temperance to a negative fourth derivative of the
utility function (Kimball 1992). Most of the commonly used utility functions imply
mixed risk aversion, which means that the derivatives of the utility functions exhibit
alternating signs (see Brocket and Golden 1987; as well as Caballe´ and Pomansky
1996). These utility functions imply risk averse as well as prudent and temperate
behavior. In typical life-cycle models of consumption, prudence implies that an
individual saves more if the risk of future income increases (also called
‘‘precautionary saving’’ which leads to more precautionary wealth) while temper-
ance is a necessary condition that introducing an independent unfair background
risk reduces the investment in risky assets (a necessary and sufficient condition is a
combination of higher-order risk preferences called risk vulnerability, see Gollier
and Pratt 1996).1 However, empirical estimates for the fraction of saving that is
precautionary are extremely diverse, ranging from close to zero to greater than 50%
(see Geyer 2011, for an overview). In their critical review of the topic, Carroll and
Kimball (2008) conclude that estimates of precautionary wealth are sensitive to
elicitation procedures and subject to problems from unobserved heterogeneity.
Therefore, recent studies have analyzed the prevalence of higher-order risk
preferences via laboratory experiments in which individuals decide privately over
lotteries that only affect their own payoffs (see Tarazona-Go´mez 2004; Deck and
Schlesinger 2010, 2014, 2016; Ebert and Wiesen 2011, 2014; Maier and Ru¨ger
2012; Krieger and Mayrhofer 2012, 2017; Noussair et al. 2014; Haering et al. 2017).
1 As Gollier and Pratt (1996, p.1114) point out: ‘‘any unfair risk can be expressed as the combination of a
mean-zero risk and a deterministic downward shift in wealth’’.
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Most of these experiments are based on the model-independent and non-parametric
definition of higher-order risk preferences introduced by Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger
(2006). They find that a majority of choices are risk averse, prudent, and
temperate—the only exception is the study by Deck and Schlesinger (2010) which
finds more intemperate than temperate behavior.
In a recent study, Noussair et al. (2014) experimentally elicit higher-order risk
preferences from a representative sample of the Dutch population and observe most
choices to be risk averse, prudent, and temperate. They also correlate individual
lottery choices with individual field behavior. Interestingly, Noussair et al. (2014)
do not observe any correlation of risk aversion with financial decisions in the field.
However, in line with theoretical results, they observe more prudent individuals to
have less credit card debt and more temperate individuals to have less risky
investment portfolios. These real world decisions, however, are most often not made
individually but in the social settings of households or organizations. That means,
they affect more than one person or are made after consulting with others. In this
respect, the settings in which they are made differ from the settings that have been
studied experimentally thus far.2
In this paper, we study the social dimension of higher-order risk preferences. To
limit confounding gender effects we focus on the behavior of male subjects only.
We find that the majority of subjects are risk averse, prudent, and temperate
individually and across social settings. Moreover, other-regarding concerns and the
ability to communicate with a partner do not impact (higher-order) risk preferences
per se. However, we observe a significant influence of the partner on the
individual’s decisions with respect to risk aversion and prudence when subjects are
able to communicate and the decision affects both.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses related papers
on second-order risk aversion in social settings and presents our hypotheses.
Section 3 describes the experimental design and procedure. Section 4 presents the
results and Sect. 5 concludes the paper.
2 Related literature and hypotheses
Several empirical studies have analyzed decision making under uncertainty in social
settings without considering higher-order risk preferences. One stream of the
literature starting with Stoner (1961) compares decisions made by groups to
decisions made by individuals. Since then, hundreds of studies have examined
group decisions and found that group members move to the more extreme points
when making decisions; that is, they exhibit risky shifts or cautious shifts (see, e.g.,
Isenberg 1986 for a survey). Recent studies from experimental economics also find a
movement towards more extreme positions in group decisions, although somewhat
2 An exception is the very recent work by Ebert and van de Kuilen (2015). They study—among other
things—situations involving outcomes accruing to another person. However, in their study the decision-
maker decides over the other person’s wealth only. Therefore their results cannot be compared directly to
ours.
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more are in favor of the cautious shift (see e.g. Bateman and Munro 2005; Shupp
and Williams 2008; Sutter 2009).
However, as Trautmann and Vieider (2012) point out in a survey on social
influences on risk attitudes, ‘‘[g]roup decisions are complex and involve voting rules
and dynamic decision processes that make it potentially difficult to identify effects
on risk attitudes’’ (p. 588, see also Sutter 2009; Bolton et al. 2015 for similar
arguments). Thus, another stream of the literature tries to isolate the effects of single
aspects of social settings on decisions made individually. Our study follows this
approach: first, we study if an individual’s decision is influenced by whether it is
also payoff relevant for someone else so that other-regarding concerns may impact
choices. Second, we study whether choices are influenced by communication.
Lastly, we are interested in how these two aspects of a social setting interact.
Different from previous work we also consider prudence and temperance.
Standard economic theory does not make predictions for the influence of the
social setting on individual decisions. Thus, in the following we will formulate null
hypotheses for our main statistical tests assuming that the decision maker is not
influenced by the social setting in any way. With respect to each hypothesis we will
also discuss the related literature on second-order risk aversion as well as potential
explanations for an influence of the social setting.
Decision making in social settings is often characterized by some form of
responsibility for the payoffs of others. For simplicity we focus on situations with
payoff commonality, i.e. a decision has the same payoff consequences for the
decision maker and the person he is responsible for.3 The first (null) hypothesis we
will test in our experiment is the following:
Hypothesis 1 An individual’s decisions are not influenced by whether his lottery
choices are also payoff-relevant for someone else.
Contrary to this hypothesis individuals harboring other-regarding concerns might
very well be influenced by responsibility. Yet, prior evidence is not unequivocal and
results vary based on the experimental designs and preference elicitation methods
employed. For instance, Sutter (2009) employs an experimental design that is based
on the risk elicitation method by Gneezy and Potters (1997). In this task subjects
decide on howmuch to invest into a lottery that yields a gain with a probability of one
third or a loss otherwise. Sutter observes a risky shift: subjects take more risk (that
means they invest more) when they are responsible for others’ payoffs compared to
when decisions are made individually. In contrast, using the same task (but different
design) Fu¨llbrunn and Luhan (2015) observe a cautious shift. Applying the multiple
price list method by Holt and Laury (2002) neither Bolton et al. (2015), Humphrey
and Renner (2011) nor Eijkelenbloom and Vostroknutov (2016) find a significant
influence of responsibility. In this method people decide repeatedly between two
lotteries with constant positive outcomes but varying probabilities.
Furthermore, Bolton and Ockenfels (2010) and Andersson et al. (2016) compare
choices between a safe positive payoff and a 50–50 lottery with and without
3 Please note that for this reason we do not focus on theories of social preferences such as reciprocity or
inequity aversion (Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels 2000).
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responsibility. Both studies find no significant responsibility effect with respect to
payoffs in the gain domain. In addition, Andersson et al. (2016) observe weakly
significantly more risk taking under responsibility in the loss domain. Also
considering 50–50 lotteries over gains and loss separately, Pahlke et al. (2015),
observe a cautions shift with respect to the gain domain and no significant difference
with respect to the loss domain. Furthermore, focusing only on the gain domain in
another experiment, they observe no significant difference in lotteries with a
winning probability of 10% and a cautious shift in lotteries with a winning
probability of 90%.4
Despite the mixed evidence several arguments suggesting an influence of
responsibility have been made. For example, Bolton et al. (2015) argue that
responsibility for others might be equated with caution which would lead to more
risk averse choices in general (see also Pahlke et al. 2015). Another explanation they
present is the aim to avoid blame for bad outcomes (see also Eijkelenbloom and
Vostroknutov 2016). A related explanation for shifts in choices is the idea that
decision makers care about the preferences of others but have systematically biased
estimates of these preferences as discussed by Bolton et al. (2015), Fu¨llbrunn and
Luhan (2015) and Pahlke et al. (2015).5 Also increased size of overall stakes in
decisions with responsibility may lead to more cautious behavior: Once subjects
take into account the payoff of others the stakes of their decisions increase (see also
Pahlke et al. 2015; Vieider et al. 2016). It is well known that increasing the stakes of
lotteries leads to more risk averse decisions (see e.g. Binswanger 1981; Holt and
Laury 2002; Haering et al. 2017).6
Social settings often also offer the possibility to communicate with others before
making decisions under uncertainty. Before considering the interaction of respon-
sibility with communication, we focus on the pure effect of communication. The
respective (null) hypothesis we test in our experiment is the following:
Hypothesis 2 An individual’s decisions are not influenced by the preferences of
someone else he can communicate with.
However, prior evidence from the experimental literature on second-order risk
preferences suggests that people are influenced by knowing the preferences of
others (even without responsibility). Most studies considering this setting do not
4 Several studies also compare decisions that are payoff-relevant to the decision maker to decisions that
are only payoff-relevant for someone else (and not to the decision maker). For example, Fu¨llbrunn and
Luhan (2015) and Eriksen and Kvaloy (2010) observe a cautions shift based on the task by Gneezy and
Potters (1997). Using the same task Pollmann et al. (2014) observe more risky decisions for others
instead. However, in their study the gap disappears after repetition. Applying 50–50 lotteries, Andersson
et al. (2016) do not observe differences in the gain domain but weakly significantly more risky choices for
others in the loss domain. See also the survey by Trautmann and Vieider (2012).
5 See also Eriksen and Kvaloy (2010) and Pollmann et al. (2014) who mention the potential discrepancy
between estimated and actual preferences with respect to decisions that are only payoff-relevant for
someone else.
6 Pahlke et al. (2015) conclude that their findings are at odds with a stake size explanation as well as a
carefulness norm explanation. Instead they argue that responsibility may amplify the behavioral pattern
captured by prospect theory. In a follow-up study, Vieider et al. (2016) confirm this conjecture
by structurally estimating a prospect theory model.
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focus on bidirectional communication but simply inform individuals about other
people’s choices. These studies include the work by Yechiam et al. (2008), Cooper
and Rege (2011), Lahno and Serra-Garcia (2015), Gioia (2017) and Bolton et al.
(2015). Different from these studies Bougheas et al. (2013) allow participants to
exchange free-form messages. However, all of the studies suggest that behavior
between decision makers correlates once they can communicate or are informed
about preferences of others.
Cooper and Rege (2011) present a systematic discussion of potential drivers of
peer effects. One explanation is a fundamental taste for conforming to the decisions
of others (see also Lahno and Serra-Garcia 2015). Another explanation they discuss
is that imitating the choices of others functions as a heuristic applied to aid complex
decision-making. Closely related is the idea of knowledge spillovers. People who
can exchange information about the decision situation may learn from each other
and make more similar decisions thereafter. Note that these explanations may apply
with and without payoff commonality. Another explanation Cooper and Rege
(2011) discuss is based on social regret: without payoff commonality people may
choose like others to avoid a situation in which others made a different choice
resulting in higher payoffs [for related explanations see also Lahno and Serra-Garcia
(2015) on envy and Bolton et al. (2015) on the avoidance of ex-post inequality in
payoffs].7
Lastly, we will analyze the combination of other-regarding concerns with
communication. In this scenario we consider the situation in which individuals
make decisions with responsibility for the payoffs of someone else and can
communicate with the affected person. Thus we now consider whether responsi-
bility changes the influence the communicating partner has on the decision maker.
Accordingly, with respect for settings with communication the third (null)
hypothesis that we test for is:
Hypothesis 3 An individual’s decisions are influenced in the same way by
someone for whom they are payoff-relevant as by someone for whom they are not
payoff-relevant.
Prior evidence on the effect of communication with and without responsibility is
limited. To our knowledge, only Bolton et al. (2015) compare both situations by
also conducting a treatment with responsibility and information on peer behavior.
They find that with and without responsibility subjects follow choices of peers.
However, the effect is asymmetric: With responsibility they are more likely to
follow those who are more risk averse than themselves than those who are less risk
7 Note that these drivers per se only explain aggregate differences in the variance of risk preferences but
not differences in average risk preferences. Different average risk preferences can be explained if these
drivers are asymmetric or correlate with an individual’s risk preference. For example, if only risk averse
people imitate others or if only more risk averse choices are worth imitating then learning about other’s
risk preferences will also yield less risk averse decisions on aggregate. Of the studies considering a
potential effect of communication on the level of risk aversion, Yechiam et al. (2008) observe more risky
decisions once individuals are informed about the choices of others while Bougheas et al. (2013), Bolton
et al. (2015), Lahno and Serra-Garcia (2015) and Gioia (2017) observe no significant effect on the level of
risk taking.
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averse. Without responsibility decision makers are equally likely to adjust their
decisions towards the preferences of peers.
Theoretical considerations may also lead us to expect a mediating effect of
responsibility on peer effects. On the one hand the previously mentioned explanations
for a responsibility effect may depend on the availability of a communication channel.
For example, misaligned beliefs about others’ preferences may easily be corrected by
communication. On the other hand, also explanations for a communication effect may
depend on payoff commonality. Especially social regret should be absent in situations
inwhich participants earn the same payoffs. An additional explanation for an influence
of communication in settings with responsibility and payoff commonality is guilt
aversion. As Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) summarize: ‘‘A guilt-averse player
suffers from guilt to the extent he believes he hurts others relative to what they believe
they will get. Therefore, he is motivated by his beliefs about others’ beliefs’’ (p. 1583).
That means, a guilt-averse decision maker may be influenced by others who share
information about their beliefs, e.g. what kind of lottery choice they expect him to
make. In this case a guilt-averse decision maker may gain utility by fulfilling these
expectations.
3 Experimental design
3.1 Lotteries
The aim of this study is to compare higher-order risk preferences of individuals in
different social settings. Therefore, it is more informative to measure the intensity
rather than the mere direction of these risk preferences. The only experiment
measuring intensities so far is the study by Ebert and Wiesen (2014). They base
their elicitation method on the risk apportioning lotteries introduced by Eeckhoudt
and Schlesinger (2006) and on the compensation premia introduced by Crainich and
Eeckhoudt (2008). The elicitation method of Ebert and Wiesen (2014) follows a
multiple price list approach, as known from Cohen et al. (1987), Tversky and
Kahneman (1992), or Holt and Laury (2002), among others. However, in contrast to
common price list approaches in which probabilities are varied (while outcomes are
held constant), Ebert and Wiesen (2014) vary outcomes (while holding probabilities
constant). We apply their elicitation method in our experimental design.
Subjects face pairwise lotteries in three different tasks: a risk aversion task, a
prudence task, and a temperance task, consisting of one, three, and two stages,
respectively. In each stage, the subjects face 20 decision situations that are
displayed by two lotteries, one ‘‘less risky’’ and one ‘‘more risky’’ (see Fig. 1).
Following Ebert and Wiesen (2014), the lotteries are displayed as draws from one
or more urns and outcomes are framed as losses.8 However, each subject receives an
8 Note that Deck and Schlesinger (2010) and Maier and Ru¨ger (2012) find no evidence of a loss framing
on the prevalence of higher-order risk preferences. Still, framing might influence the strength of higher-
order risk preferences and the impact of the social setting. Also, the prudence and temperance lotteries are
displayed in compound form as separate draws from two or three urns which may also influence the
measurement of higher-order risk preferences (Haering et al. 2017; Deck and Schlesinger 2016).
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endowment that depends on the task. In the risk aversion task the endowment is €25,
while in the prudence and temperance tasks the endowments are €20 and €17.50,
respectively (for each stage within a task). In the prudence and temperance tasks
also zero-mean risks ~e matter. Depending on the stage, ~e takes the values
~e ¼ ½0:5; 7; 0:5; 7, ~e ¼ ½0:8; 3:5; 0:2; 14, and ~e ¼ ½0:8; 3:5; 0:2; 14 in the
prudence task.9 In the temperance task subjects face two zero-mean risks, ~e1 and ~e2.
Depending on the stage, these risks take the values ~e1 ¼ ½0:5; 7; 0:5; 7 and ~e2 ¼
½0:5; 3:5; 0:5; 3:5 or ~e1 ¼ ½0:8; 2:8; 0:2; 11:1 and ~e2 ¼ ½0:8; 2:8; 0:2; 11:1.
In each of the six stages the subjects face 20 decision situations in which the
compensation premia m varies in steps of €0.25. We collect data using the ranges
[-2.5, 2.25] and [-0.5, 4.25].10 The risk neutral compensation is €0.00, leading to
an expected value of €17.5 for each stage. Choosing a compensation premium of
Fig. 1 Lottery pairs for risk aversion, prudence, and temperance tasks. Note The different stage-
dependent zero-mean risks are denoted by ~e and the potential compensation premia by m
9 Note that the background risk in the second and third stage of the prudence task is skewed. A left-
skewed (right-skewed) background risk decreases (increases) the difference in kurtosis of the overall
lotteries, which might also be important with regard to temperance (see e.g. Mayrhofer 2017). See Ebert
and Wiesen (2014) for the statistical features of the lottery pairs (‘‘web appendix, section B’’).
10 Ebert and Wiesen (2014) vary the range of the risk premium in the same way. In addition, they vary its
grid size (€0.25 and €0.50). They observe that the range has an influence on choices while grid size has
not. Because we select a grid size of €0.25, our data corresponds to their ‘‘fine grid’’ data.
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less than zero reveals (2nd-, 3rd-, or 4th-order) risk loving behavior while choosing
a compensation premium above zero reveals (2nd-, 3rd-, or 4th-order) risk averse
behavior. An individual’s risk premium m is the smallest amount that makes him
choose the ‘‘more risky’’ lottery.
3.2 Treatments
The experiment is split into two parts. In Part I, we elicit the preferences for all
subjects individually. This part follows Ebert and Wiesen (2014). For a more
detailed description of Part I of the experiment please see ‘‘Online Appendix A’’
where we give an example on how to elicit higher-order risk preferences and
‘‘Online Appendix B’’ that shows the instructions that were given to the participants.
The private elicitation of individual preferences serves as our Baseline treatment.
This approach allows us to control for individual preferences when comparing
behavior across treatments in Part II.
In Part II, we vary the social setting in a simple 2 9 2 design yielding the baseline
treatment and three additional treatments. In each of these three additional treatments,
the individual is paired with another subject, who is referred to as the partner. The role
of the partner varies across treatments. Subjects are randomly distributed across the
four treatments and two roles (individual and partner). Since some individuals face the
Baseline treatment also in Part II, we are able to assess the effect of repeating the
decision task (and control for it in our regression analyses). In the three additional
treatments, the elicitation method follows the elicitation method of the Baseline
treatment. That is, the second part is also organized in six stages, where the stages of
the second part equal the stages of the first part. Note that we ran all four treatments
within each session. This minimizes the potential influence of session-level effects on
our results. ‘‘Online Appendix C’’ summarizes the order of events.
In the other-regarding concerns treatment O, individuals make decisions that not
only determine their own payoff but also the payoff of the partner who does not
make any payoff-related decisions. Both subjects receive the same payoff. Neither
can communicate (the partner is passive) but through responsibility for the partner’s
payoff other-regarding considerations might influence behavior.
In the communication treatment C, individuals can chat with their partner while
both face the same decisions. These choices are only payoff-relevant for themselves
individually. In this way, decisions can be influenced by communication but not by
other-regarding concerns. We used anonymous free-form chat messages that
subjects exchanged on a computer screen. This allows us to study the content of the
messages while avoiding confounding effects from face-to-face interaction, such as
those due to reputation.
Finally, in the CO treatment, individuals make decisions that determine their own
payoff and also the payoff of the partnering subject. Again, both subjects receive the
same payoff. However, in this treatment they can also chat with the otherwise
passive partner, allowing for communication and other-regarding concerns to
influence decisions. For a more detailed description of Part II of the experiment
please see the instructions that were given to the participants shown in ‘‘Online
Appendix D’’.
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Table 1 summarizes the four treatments. Within each treatment we also vary the
range of the price list’s grid. Following Ebert and Wiesen (2014), we refer to the
range of [–0.5, 4.25] as Shift and to the range of [–2.5, 2.25] as no shift. In 12 of the
15 sessions, 21 subjects participated in each session, 3 of them in the Baseline
treatment and 6 of them in each of the remaining treatments. In the remaining 3
sessions, 22 subjects participated in each session. In these sessions, we collected one
additional observation for the Baseline treatment. We had to exclude six subjects
(three pairs) that participated in the CO treatment of the first session due to a display
error. Eight sessions were conducted with the shift grid and seven sessions with the
no shift grid, yielding the number of participants (N) displayed in Table 1.
3.3 Experimental procedure
The experiment was conducted at the Essen Laboratory for Experimental
Economics (elfe) at the University of Duisburg-Essen, Germany. Altogether, 312
subjects participated and sessions lasted 90 min each. We only consider the
behavior of same-gender pairs. Given that several studies have suggested that
women’s behavior is more risk averse than men’s (for surveys, see Eckel and
Grossman 2008; Croson and Gneezy 2009), the gender make up of the participants
could influence behavior in social settings. The results on higher-order risk
preferences show that women are—with weak significance—also more prudent and
temperate than men (Ebert and Wiesen 2014). Due to our focus on individual
decision making, interactions between participants of different gender would have
required several additional treatments. We chose to study male subjects instead of
females only for recruitment reasons: there are more males in the subject pool.
Subjects were recruited using the software ORSEE (Greiner 2004). The experiment
was programmed with z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007), while communication between
individuals and their partners was facilitated by the EasyChat software.11
Subjects entered the laboratory one after another and were randomly allocated to
a workspace (by drawing a ball with their work space number from an urn) where
they found the instructions for Part I. In this way, subjects were also allocated to the
different treatments of Part II also allowing us to control the number of subjects in
Table 1 Treatments
Treatment Part 1 Part 2 N (shift/no
shift)
Communication Other-regarding
concerns
Communication Other-regarding
concerns
Baseline No No No No 48 (24/24)
O No No No Yes 90 (48/42)
C No No Yes No 90 (48/42)
CO No No Yes Yes 84 (42/42)
11 See www.ec3hp.de for more information. Unnecessary components of EasyChat’s user interface were
hidden using Zorro, see www.gabrieleponti.com/software.
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each treatment. Questions were answered in private at the subject’s workspace by
the experimenter. At this time, communication between the subjects was not
permitted. Part I started only after the subjects had successfully answered two
comprehension questions about the instructions on their computer. These questions
asked the subjects to calculate the payoffs of potential lottery outcomes in two
decision situations.
In Part I the subjects first made their decisions in the risk aversion task.
Subsequently, they made decisions in the prudence task with three stages and in the
temperance task with two stages. Ebert and Wiesen (2014) do not find evidence for
order effects when varying the order of the tasks. Therefore, we only ran one order
of tasks. We started with the elicitation of risk aversion because the respective
lotteries are somewhat simpler than the prudence and temperance lotteries that
follow. We think that this makes it easier for the subjects to get used to the decision
environment (see Noussair et al. 2014 for a similar reasoning). Note that this is also
an argument for eliciting individual preferences in Part I before assigning subjects to
the more complex treatments C, O and CO in Part II. We control for learning effects
between Part I and Part II in our regressions (see the next section). The order of the
stages within the prudence or the temperance task was randomly determined for
each subject. After finishing all 120 decisions of the first part of the experiment, the
subjects entered one of the four treatments of Part II and received the respective
instructions for another 120 decisions. In the last step, the subjects’ payoff was
determined randomly. To avoid wealth and averaging effects, we used the random
payment technique (see e.g. Cubitt et al. 1998; Cox et al. 2015 for a discussion of
this method). Therefore, only one of the 240 decisions was paid out after it was
randomly chosen for each subject at the end of the experiment. Subjects earned
€18.09 on average (minimum €1.00, maximum €34.00). Finally, the subjects were
paid in private and left the laboratory one after another.
4 Results
4.1 Individual higher-order risk preferences
The results from Part I of our experiment can be directly compared to the findings
presented by Ebert and Wiesen (2014). We follow their procedures in our data
analysis and exclude subjects that switched more than two times in more than one of
the six stages. Therefore, 35 out of 312 subjects (11%) are excluded, which is a
higher percentage than the 6% reported by Ebert and Wiesen (2014) but is similar to
studies using a multiple price list format [cf. 13% in Holt and Laury (2002) and 12%
in Krieger and Mayrhofer (2012)]. For the analysis of Part I, we consider all of the
subjects independent of the role that they will take in Part II (i.e., we consider
individuals and partners).
We calculate an individual i’s risk premium in Part I mIi as the average m
I
ij
selected over the stages j within the respective task. The average risk premium is
€1.17 in the risk aversion task, €1.53 in the prudence task, and €0.99 in the
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temperance task. All of the premia are significantly different from zero, which is the
neutral switch point (p\ 0.001, two-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank tests), revealing a
tendency towards risk averse, prudent, and temperate behavior. Furthermore, the
average risk premium differs significantly between tasks: it is largest in the
prudence task and smallest in the temperance task (p B 0.025). In their sessions
with the same grid size for potential risk premia (‘‘grid 0.25’’ in their terminology),
Ebert and Wiesen (2014) observe slightly larger risk premia in the risk aversion task
(€1.26) and the prudence task (€1.56), and a somewhat lower premium in the
temperance task (€0.90).12
Overall, 17% of our subjects are risk loving ð mIi\0Þ, 13% are risk neutral
ð mIi ¼ 0Þ, and 70% are risk averse ð mIi [ 0Þ. Regarding prudence, we find that 6%
of our subjects in Part I are imprudent, 4% are prudent-neutral, and 90% of our
subjects are prudent. In the temperance task, 16% of the subjects are intemperate,
8% are temperate-neutral, and 76% are temperate. Our results are very similar to the
findings by Ebert and Wiesen (2014). In their experiment, 66% of subjects are risk
averse, 88% are prudent, and 75% are temperate.
In addition, we observe that shifting the grid influences choices significantly.
Like Ebert and Wiesen (2014), we find more risk averse, prudent and temperate
behavior when the range of options is [-0.5, 4.25] in the Shift sessions than when it
is [-2.5, 2.25] in the No Shift sessions (p\ 0.001, two-sided Mann–Whitney-
U tests). This observation may be due to the subjects’ well-known tendency to
choose options in the middle of the price list (Ebert and Wiesen 2014; Abdellaoui
et al. 2011). The left-hand side of Fig. 2 shows the average risk premia elicited with
both types of grids. It reveals that the average risk premia are significantly higher for
prudence than for risk aversion and temperance in the Shift sessions (p B 0.044,
two-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank tests) as well as in the No Shift sessions
(p B 0.004). The right-hand side of Fig. 2 shows the cumulative distributions of the
risk premia. For example, the number of risk averse individuals reduces from 74%
in the Shift sessions to 65% in the No Shift sessions. The number of participants
classified as prudent and temperate reduces from 96 and 87% to 85 and 65%.
The large data set of individual decisions collected in Part I also allows for the
identification of behavioral types. Deck and Schlesinger (2014) observe that
decisions under uncertainty can be explained surprisingly well by mixed risk averse
(Brocket and Golden 1987; Caballe´ and Pomansky 1996) or mixed risk loving
preferences (Crainich et al. 2013; Ebert 2013). While mixed risk averters are risk
averse, prudent, and temperate, mixed risk loving individuals are risk loving,
prudent, and intemperate. Therefore, both mixed risk averse as well as mixed risk
loving individuals are prudent.
On aggregate, we observe a higher risk premium in the prudence tasks than in the
risk aversion and temperance tasks. This pattern is consistent with mixed risk
aversion and mixed risk loving behavior. Following Deck and Schlesinger (2014),
12 Like Ebert and Wiesen (2014), we also observe positive and significant correlations between the risk
premia as measured by the Spearman rank correlation coefficients (p\ 0.001): the risk premium in the
risk aversion task is positively correlated with the premium in the prudence task (rs = 0.468) as well as
with the premium in the temperance task (rs = 0.349). The premia in the prudence and in the temperance
task are also positively correlated with each other (rs = 0.482).
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we also consider the individual choices of risk averters and risk lovers separately in
the prudence and the temperance tasks. If people are either mixed risk averse or
mixed risk loving, then the sign of their risk premia should coincide with respect to
prudence but differ with respect to temperance. Of the 194 subjects who are risk
averse, 94.3% demand a positive average premium in the prudence tasks and 82.0%
do so in the temperance tasks. Of the 48 subjects who are risk loving, 83.3%
demand a positive average premium in the prudence tasks but only 54.2% of them
do so in the temperance tasks.13
4.2 Higher-order risk preferences in social settings
4.2.1 Choices of decision-making individuals
In the following analysis of the influence of the social setting we ignore the partners
but focus on the decision making individuals. Applying the same consistency check
in Part II led to the exclusion of one additional subject. Analogous to Part I, the
average risk premia mIIi in all four treatments in Part II are significantly different
from zero (p B 0.001, two-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank tests). Thus, our experiment
Shift
No Shift 
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
Risk Aversion Prudence Temperance
0.0
0.3
0.5
0.8
1.0
-2.0 -1.0 0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0
Risk Aversion Prudence Temperance
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
Risk Aversion Prudence Temperance
0.0
0.3
0.5
0.8
1.0
-2.0 -1.0 0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0
Risk Aversion Prudence Temperance
Fig. 2 Means and cumulative distributions of risk premia in Part I
13 Note, however, that in the Shift sessions only 2 of the 20 available premia of the decision grid to
choose from were negative. This could induce the subjects to choose larger premia overall. In fact, we
find that risk lovers in the Shift sessions ask for positive premia that differ significantly from zero in the
prudence as well as in the temperance tasks (p B 0.003, two-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank tests). In the No
Shift sessions, risk loving subjects only ask for significantly positive risk premia in the prudence tasks
(p = 0.011) but not in the temperance tasks (p = 0.957). In the Shift as well as in the No Shift sessions, risk
averters ask for positive premia that differ significantly from zero in the prudence and the temperance
tasks (p\ 0.001).
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reveals that Ebert and Wiesen’s (2014) main finding on individual decisions that are
made privately with respect to one’s own payoff applies more broadly. Based on the
average risk premia, the majority of subjects are also classified as risk averse,
prudent, and temperate in settings that allow for communication and other-regarding
concerns (see Table 2). We summarize these observations as follows:
Observation 1 Across all social settings we find that the behavior of the majority
of the subjects is risk averse, prudent, and temperate.
Table 2 shows that, as in Part I, in Part II more choices are prudent than risk averse
or temperate. This basic pattern is the same across all treatments. In the Baseline
treatment the average risk premium is higher for prudence than for risk aversion and
for temperance (p = 0.001, two-sided Mann–Whitney-U test) but it does not differ
between temperance and risk aversion (p = 0.911). In treatment O the risk premium
for risk aversion is weakly significantly smaller than for prudence (p = 0.087) and
significantly larger than for temperance (p\ 0.001). The risk premia for risk
aversion and temperance only differ slightly (p = 0.101). The risk premia in the C
and in the CO treatment for risk aversion increase relative to those for prudence. In
both treatments, they do not differ significantly from each other (p C 0.345).
However, the risk premia for prudence are still significantly larger than for
temperance (p B 0.044). In treatment C the premium for risk aversion is weakly
significantly larger than for temperance (p = 0.062). This difference is significant in
the CO treatment (p = 0.004).
Our data set is not rich enough to analyze mixed risk averse and mixed risk
loving patterns, or their interaction within treatments. But aggregated decisions in
the Baseline treatment and, to a lesser degree, in the O treatment are in line with the
concepts of mixed risk averse and mixed risk loving behavior, as observed by Deck
and Schlesinger (2014): premia are higher for prudence than for risk aversion and
temperance. The two communication treatments C and CO exhibit a different
pattern: premia for prudence do not differ significantly from those for risk aversion.
This might be driven by social interaction, which we will explore further in the
following section.
4.2.2 Influence of partners on the decision-making individuals
Our experiment allows for quantification of the change of individual risk
preferences associated with social settings. To identify the influence of social
settings on risk attitudes, we run panel regressions with the risk premium as the
dependent variable. Our data is censored: depending on the shift of the price list,
Table 2 Subject classification
by treatment in Part II
Risk averse (%) Prudent (%) Temperate (%)
Baseline 67 95 79
Treatment C 73 82 67
Treatment O 60 88 67
Treatment CO 80 88 80
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roughly half of our subjects faced a price list ranging from -2.5 to 2.25 while the
other half faced a price lift ranging from -0.5 to 4.25. Accounting for individual
differences in censoring, we run a random effects interval regression estimated via
maximum likelihood. We estimate an individual i’s risk premium mi
k within part k as
mki ¼ b0 þ b1  mIi þ b2  cki þ b3  cki  mIi þ b4  oki þ b5  oki  mIi
þb6  coki þ b7  coki  mIi þ b8  rk þ b9  si þ gi þ eki :
We run one regression for risk aversion, one for prudence, and one for
temperance. Within these regressions we do not consider average risk premia as
dependent variable but choices within each stage j of Parts I and II. We drop the
index j to simplify notation. Per subject, this yields two observations from the stages
of the risk aversion task, six observations from the stages of the prudence task, and
four observations from the stages in the temperance task—one half from Part I, the
other from Part II. This estimation approach allows us to assess the influence of
potential communication and other-regarding concerns on behavior while control-
ling for individual differences in risk attitudes (via the observations in Part I) and
any potential repetition effects (via the Baseline treatment).
The potential influence of communication and other-regarding concerns across
treatments are indicated by the binary variables c, o and co. The variable c takes the
value of one if subjects can communicate (in treatments C and CO) while o takes the
value of one if subjects are responsible for a partner so that other regarding concerns
may influence behavior (in treatments O andCO). Finally, co equals one if both are the
case; that is, this dummy captures any complementary effects of communication and
other-regarding concerns. These dummies are also interacted with the partner’s risk
premium in Part Imi. The interaction terms capture the varying influences the partner
has on the decisionmaker. The repetition of a stage in Part II is indicated by the dummy
r, which captures potential learning effects across parts. The shift of the grid of risk
premia from [-2.5, 2.25] to [-0.5, 4.25] is indicated by the dummy s. Furthermore, we
assume independent and normally distributed error terms denoted by g and e that
capture differences between individuals and idiosyncratic effects within stages.14
The resulting average marginal effects and standard errors are presented in
Table 3, while Table 4 contains explanations of the independent variables. In model
(1) we only consider the aggregate treatment effects and do not consider the
different influences that the partners may have on the decision making individuals.
In model (2) we also take into account this potential influence. In both models and
across tasks, the results reveal a consistent positive effect of shifting the grid but no
systematic learning effect across parts.
In model (1) the regression results do not suggest any influence of the social
setting on temperance: Neither the communication dummy c nor the other-regarding
14 To estimate meaningful effects of the respective partners on the decision making individuals, we place
additional restrictions on the data. First, we only consider individuals who are consistent in Part I and Part
II. With respect to the C and CO treatments, we only consider pairs in which both subjects decided
consistently in Part I. This leads to the exclusion of another 18 subjects. Because of potential correlation
within the symmetric pairs of the C treatment, we only consider one randomly selected decision maker of
each pair.
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concerns dummy o indicates a significant difference to the Baseline treatment, in
which decisions are made privately and are only payoff-relevant for the decision
maker. Also, there appears to be no complementary effect of communication and
other-regarding concerns as the co dummy is insignificant as well. With respect to
risk aversion and prudence, however, the social setting matters: the regressions
reveal a significant positive effect of other-regarding concerns in combination with
communication (co) on the premium in the risk aversion task. The regressions also
reveal a weakly significant negative effect of other-regarding concerns (o) on the
premium in the prudence task. Our (null) hypothesis 1 states that an individual’s
decisions are not influenced by whether they are also payoff relevant for someone
else (treatment O). Based on the latter finding we can only reject (null) hypothesis 1
for prudence (with weak significance):
Observation 2 We find no differences in risk aversion and temperance but less
prudence when an individual’s decisions are also payoff-relevant for someone else.
In model (2) we focus on the size of the influence the partner has on the decision
maker. As expected, the partner does not have a significant influence in either the
Baseline treatment or in the O treatment. Because no communication takes place, no
influence is possible. This might be different in the communication treatments since
subjects are allowed to exchange information on each other’s preferences and thus
might adjust their choices accordingly. Our (null) hypothesis 2 states that there is no
influence of the partner, even in the treatments with communication. Therefore, we
test whether the correlation between preferences differs from that in the Baseline
treatment. These differences would be captured by the cm-i interaction term. We
find that the coefficients are positive but not significant at reasonable levels
regarding risk aversion, prudence, or temperance. Thus, we cannot reject (null)
hypothesis 2:
Observation 3 We do not find a significant influence of the partner on the
individual’s decisions when the partner can communicate his preferences to the
decision maker. This observation is made with respect to risk aversion, prudence,
and temperance.
Lastly, we study whether communication matters more in combination with other-
regarding concerns, e.g. through responsibility for the partner’s payoff. Our (null)
hypothesis 3 states that we should find no additional effect of the partner’s
preferences on the decisions in the CO treatment. This additional effect would be
captured by the interaction term com-i in model (2). Table 3 shows that this
coefficient is not significant with respect to temperance but it is significantly
positive with respect to risk aversion and prudence. Say a decision maker is paired
with a partner who demands a €1 higher risk premium. In the risk aversion stage he
will demand €0.30 more for himself in CO than in the other treatments on average.
In the prudence stage, he will demand €0.36 more. Thus, our results not only
suggest that the social dimension is important for risk aversion and prudence but
they also suggest that communication mainly matters in combination with other-
regarding concerns. Therefore, we reject hypothesis 3 with respect to risk aversion
and prudence:
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Observation 4 We find a significantly stronger influence of the partner on the
individual’s decisions when they are also payoff relevant for the partner. This
observation is made with respect to risk aversion and prudence but not temperance.
The results of model (2) also suggest that the more risk averse behavior in CO found
in model (1) appears to be driven by the matching of decision makers with risk
averse partners: In model (2) the co dummy turns insignificant after controlling for
the influence of the partner on the decision maker. To shed more light on the peer
effects in treatments C and CO, we present a breakdown of choices in Table 4 (also
see ‘‘Online Appendix E’’ for figures illustrating the individual choice patterns
across treatments). We summarize the relative frequencies of people who make
more, the same number of, or less risk averse choices after having the chance to
communicate with the partner. For both treatments we split subjects into two
groups: those who are matched with someone less risk averse ( mIi\ m
I
i ) are shown
on the left-hand side and those matched with someone more risk averse ( mIi[ m
I
i )
on the right-hand side. Separate Fisher’s exact tests for risk aversion, prudence and
temperance indicate that distributions differ between both groups in treatment CO
(p B 0.008, Fisher’s exact tests) but not in treatment C (p C 0.181). Thus, in line
with the regression results for risk aversion and prudence (but not temperance) we
find a significant influence of the partner in CO but not in C. Furthermore, we
analyze the communication content of the No Shift sessions. We find that this
relationship is also mirrored in the communication patterns: Even though the
frequency of mentioning preferred choices does not differ between treatments, in
CO agreement with the other person’s choice is more often voiced than in C (see
‘‘Online Appendix F’’ for details). It is important to note that the partner’s influence
sometimes leads to a shift in preferences. For example, of all risk-averters ( mIi [ 0)
in CO 22% of those matched with a non-risk-averter did not choose in a risk-averse
manner in Part II but made risk neutral or risk-seeking choices ( mIIi  0).
Bolton et al. (2015) observe that the influence of peers is asymmetric in the sense
that decision makers are more likely to adjust decisions toward more risk averse
Table 4 Changes in risk premia in C and CO depending on partner’s preferences
Treatment C Treatment CO
mIi\ m
I
i (%) m
I
i[ m
I
i (%) m
I
i\ m
I
i (%) m
I
i[ m
I
i (%)
Risk aversion mIIi [ m
I
i
23 47 13 65
mIIi ¼ mIi 46 40 33 20
mIIi \ m
I
i
31 13 53 15
Prudence mIIi [ m
I
i
27 47 14 55
mIIi ¼ mIi 0 13 7 20
mIIi \ m
I
i
73 40 79 25
Temperance mIIi [ m
I
i
19 36 6 55
mIIi ¼ mIi 25 36 12 20
mIIi \ m
I
i
56 27 82 25
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choices in settings with information about others’ preferences and responsibility.
However, we find no significant asymmetry after calculating the additive inverse of
the distribution of one of the groups and comparing it to the original distribution of
the other group. We run separate Fisher’s exact tests for risk, aversion and prudence
in both treatments. All of them turn out insignificant (p C 0.203).
5 Discussion and conclusion
Previous experiments on higher-order risk preferences have focused on eliciting
individual decisions that are made in isolation and only affect the decision maker’s
payoff. In this paper, we extend this line of research by studying the social
dimension of higher-order risk preferences. We believe this aspect of higher-order
risk preferences is of particular importance because many risky decisions are made
in social settings. Couples buying a house or board members considering building a
plant will take into account background risks when making their decisions.
However, none of them will decide in isolation and their choice affects the payoff of
more than one person. This study builds on the study by Ebert and Wiesen (2014),
who introduced a method for eliciting the strength of higher-order risk preferences.
We apply their method and systematically vary how communication and other-
regarding concerns can influence decisions.
We find that the majority of subjects is risk averse, prudent, and temperate across
social settings. In addition, our findings on decisions made individually as well as
with responsibility for the payoff of others are in line with recent findings on mixed
risk averse and mixed risk loving preferences by Deck and Schlesinger (2014). In
these treatments risk premia are higher for prudence than for risk aversion and
temperance.
Moreover, other regarding concerns do not impact preferences regarding risk
aversion and temperance when individuals cannot communicate. However, we
observe somewhat less prudent choices when subjects are also responsible for
someone else’s payoff. With respect to risk aversion our null finding is in line with
previous results. Studies also estimating risk preferences using 50–50 lotteries in the
loss domain either find weakly significantly more risk taking with responsibility
(Andersson et al. 2016) or no significant differences (Pahlke et al. 2015). It has been
argued that decision makers may harbor other-regarding concerns in these settings
but have systematically biased estimates of the preferences of others (Bolton et al.
2015; Fu¨llbrunn and Luhan 2015; Pahlke et al. 2015; Eriksen and Kvaloy 2010;
Pollmann et al. 2014). A similar bias could explain the change in prudence we
observe. However, surprisingly there appears to be no such discrepancy with respect
to risk aversion or temperance.
We do not find a significant influence of partners on decision-making individuals
when they are able to communicate but only the individual himself is affected by the
decision. With respect to risk aversion this result is at odds with several studies
finding peer effects in risk taking. In most of these studies decision makers are
automatically informed about the preferences of others which could give rise to
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experimenter demand effects. However, please note that Bougheas et al. (2013) find
peer effects also with free-form communication.
Lastly, we observe that decision-making individuals are influenced significantly
more strongly by the preferences of a partner when they are able to communicate
and choices are payoff-relevant for both of them. Our regressions reveal that this
finding applies to risk aversion and prudence but not to temperance. With respect to
risk aversion similar findings have been obtained by Bolton et al. (2015). Due to the
commonality of payoffs this peer effect cannot be driven by social regret, i.e. by
decision makers trying to avoid payoff differences in lottery outcomes (Cooper and
Rege 2011; Lahno and Serra-Garcia 2015; Bolton et al. 2015). Our analysis of chat
content reveals that in the treatment with payoff commonality subjects mention
agreement with the other’s choice more often than without payoff commonality.
This suggests that reaching consensus may drive some of the peer effects we
observe. One explanation is that decision-making individuals harbor other-regarding
concerns and adjust their choices according to the preferences of the partners.
Another explanation is based on guilt aversion. It proposes that decision-making
individuals like to fulfill the expectations of their partners. However, more research
is needed to disentangle potential explanations for peer effects.
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